Leonard Seabrooke’s
‘Everyday Legitimacy and International Financial Orders: The Social Sources of
Imperialism and Hegemony in Global Finance’ (2007)
This article draws attention to the influencing role that
non-elite players have on a state’s global financial power. Seabrooke
places importance on ‘everyday practices’ and the way they can help to
determine a state’s financial policy agenda. The article demonstrates this by
focusing on the last two periods of intensive financial globalisation: English
imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and US
hegemony in the late twentieth century. It focuses on each country’s ‘financial
reform nexus’- the credit, tax and property policies which have a significant
impact on the everyday lives of citizens from LGIs (low income groups). A state
granting its citizens greater access to credit and wealth is beneficial as it
leads to more capital being ‘recycled through the domestic system’, thus
improving ‘their international financial capacity to export and attract
capital’, and has a ‘regulatory and normative influence on its international
financial order’ (p1).
Seabrooke pays particular attention to the agency of
non-elites’ changing intersubjective understandings. He links three social
mechanisms in order to demonstrate how citizens’ preferences on a ground level
work up through the domestic political system which in turn makes an impact on
global financial relations. He describes how everyday perceptions of the
financial reform nexus (expressed through protest and other forms of activism) leads
to a state redistributing political and economic assets and access, which lower
income groups will either agree or disagree with. The state will then attempt
to spread economic social norms in an attempt to influence these citizens’
perceptions of the economy. The way that these social mechanisms play out is
what shapes the country’s influence on the international financial order.
In the case of England, the government’s failure to improve
lower income citizens’ financial mobility meant that the state struggled to
retain its international financial order as its increasingly concentrated and
narrow pool of capital left the nation’s financial power fragile to shock on
the global stage.
In the case of the US, whilst the nation’s economic
inequality was not improved, unlike in England, the agency of advocacy groups
and everyday actors was seen to improve hand-in-hand with changing expectations
about rights and entitlements within the economy. As well as this, the US’s
emphasis on creditworthiness through domestic financial reform towards the end
of the twentieth century, shaped the state’s hegemonic influence over the global
financial order by encouraging ‘the intensification of the international
institutionalisation of surveillance for creditworthiness’ (p11), upholding its hegemonic power. However, the US’s success declined as its heavy
promotion of entrepreneurial values took a hit on the lowest income citizens. The
regressive tax reforms of Bush’s administration, among other policies during
the early twenty-first century, have taken place alongside the state’s shift
from hegemonic power to imperialist.
The cases of England and the US highlight the agency that
non-elite players possess in transforming their social and economic
environments. This in turn influences the state’s hegemonic or imperialist
influence on the international financial order. This suggests that the understanding
of the financial needs of low income groups is relevant for helping to ensure
long-term global financial power.
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